At 10:00 AM on April 8, 2026, Bence Nanay, Professor of Philosophy at the University of Antwerp, has been invited to deliver an academic lecture titled “Towards a New Philosophy of Desire” at the Advanced Lecture Series in the School of Humanities, Tongji University. The lecture was moderated by Assistant Professor Shiwei Chen and featured commentary by Assistant Professor Jing Shang. In his presentation, Professor Nanay reflected on the methodological framework of contemporary philosophy of mind, which tends to favor belief over desire when explaining significant psychological phenomena. He then proposed a desire-centric approach to account for cognitive phenomena such as cognitive dissonance and epistemic bubbles.
Ⅰ. What is Cognitive Dissonance?
Cognitive dissonance is generally defined as an incompatibility (or inconsistency) between an agent’s cognitive states, which triggers an unpleasant feeling and leads to a change in attitude. Take initiation rituals as an example: subjects joining a group had to endure electric shocks. Research found that the more painful the shocks, the more strongly the subjects identified with the group. This occurs because if a subject suffers significant pain but does not initially identify with the group, a conflict arises between their behavior and their attitude. To resolve this negative emotional state, the subject is compelled to convince themselves of the value and attractiveness of the group.
Professor Nanay argued that dissonance is not a conflict between two cognitive states but should instead be explained as a conflict between a cognitive state and a conative state. He noted that the traditional Belief Model, which assumes that two contradictory beliefs trigger dissonance, faces several theoretical difficulties.
Ⅱ. The Belief Model and Its Difficulties
The Belief Model posits that the core of dissonance theory lies in the conflict between one’s self-concept and cognitions regarding a particular behavior. Self-concept refers to deeply held core beliefs about oneself, such as being competent, kind, or resolute. While logical contradictions between ordinary beliefs rarely trigger dissonance, a contradiction between a core belief and an ordinary belief is sufficient to do so.
However, the Belief Model faces three main challenges:
1. Stability of Core Beliefs: While traditionally considered difficult to change, research by Glass (1964) suggests that core beliefs are actually quite malleable.
2. Emotional States: Beliefs themselves are affect-neutral. It is difficult to explain why a conflict between mildly charged beliefs results in a highly charged emotional state.
3. Attitude Change: The Belief Model appeals to logical contradictions within inference, but since emotions cannot participate in logical inference, it fails to explain why emotional states lead to a final change in attitude.
Consequently, Professor Nanay proposed the theory of conative dissonance to avoid these shortcomings.
Ⅲ. Conative Dissonance Theory
Conative dissonance refers to a conflict between a conative state (i.e., a desire or intentional state) and a cognitive state, which elicits an emotional reaction. Specifically, it involves a conflict between a core desire and a belief. Core desires are desires regarding oneself, such as the desire to be competent or kind.
Replacing core beliefs with core desires offers greater explanatory power:
1. Malleability: Core desires are not by definition immutable, aligning with empirical research.
2. Negative Emotions: The production of negative emotions can be explained through desire frustration. Just as wanting a coffee and failing to get it causes frustration, the frustration of a core desire leads to significant negative affect.
3. Attitude Change: When negative emotions arise, individuals often employ experiential avoidance—taking measures to change the form or frequency of these internal experiences to escape them.
Fundamentally, this theory shifts the perspective on the relationship between the mind and the world. Cognitive dissonance involves a mind-to-world direction of fit (describing the world), whereas conative dissonance involves a world-to-mind direction of fit (changing the world through action).
Ⅳ. Application: Conative Bubbles
Belief polarization occurs when two agents face the same evidence but produce opposing beliefs. The classic "epistemic bubbles" explanation—that agents lack access to evidence—is often empirically false. Another explanation, "echo chambers," suggests evidence is excluded based on unreliable sources (truth value flipping), but this is criticized for being content-insensitive.
Professor Nanay proposed the alternative concept of conative bubbles. Because agents A and B have different core desires, certain evidence may frustrate A’s desires but not B’s. Frustrated desires lead to experiential avoidance, weakening the agent's exposure to that specific evidence. This model accounts for affective polarization, where groups differ not just in belief content but in the "emotional color" attached to those beliefs. In this view, affective polarization precipitates conative polarization, which in turn leads to belief polarization.
Ⅴ. Q&A
Following the lecture, Ms. Jing Shang praised the presentation and inquired whether core desires are idiosyncratic or universally shared and socially shaped. Students raised questions about why frustrated desires sometimes strengthen and why core desires are considered easy to change given their link to self-perception. The moderator, Assistant Professor Shiwei Chen, inquired whether core beliefs and core desires carry different theoretical commitments regarding De Se (first-person) content. Professor Nanay provided detailed responses to all participants, and the lecture concluded successfully.
